Mr. Chairman and Members of the Panel, the United States is pleased to present its views as a third party in this Article 21.5 proceeding.
1.
The Proper Interpretive Approach
4.
In this proceeding, as in the original, the central question raised by Argentina's Article 4.2 claim is whether the measure at issue is "similar" to a "variable import levy" or "minimum import price." Interpretation of the terms "variable import levy" and "minimum import price" is key to the resolution of the question presented. Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), and as the Appellate Body
explained in the original proceeding, these terms must be interpreted using the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, in particular, according to their ordinary meaning, in 3 their context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the WTO agreements.
5.
The United States thus cannot support Chile's assertion that, in the absence of any definition for the terms "variable import levy and/or a minimum import price, the point of departure can only be that indicated by the Panel and the Appellate Body with respect to the elements which make up such measures." It is of course correct that the issue before this 4
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at the Third Party Session Recourse to Article 21.5 9.
An assessment of the modified measure in this Article 21.5 proceeding requires the same comparison of the price band system, as it is designed and as it operates in its overall nature, to variable import levies and minimum import prices. It is not sufficient merely to compare the original and modified price band systems to determine whether Chile has addressed the "certain features" of the former that allegedly are "fundamental." 
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10.
Although Chile asserts that it has changed the price band system in such a way as to render it WTO-consistent, it appears that Chile's modified price band mechanism continues to vary the applicable duty based on the difference between a floor price and a calculated reference
price. Chile appears just to have modified somewhat the way in which those parameters are determined. The price band system with these modifications would therefore still appear to be a measure similar to variable import levies and minimum import prices within the meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
a. Variable Import Levy
11.
Examining the ordinary meaning of the term "variable import lev[y]" in light of its context, and the object and purpose of the agreements, the Appellate Body explained that a "variable import levy" is a "duty, tax, charge or other exaction" "assessed upon importation" that is "liable to vary." Further, given the context in which the term is used in footnote 1 of Article 13 4.2, the Appellate Body clarified that the variability must be intrinsic to the measure itself, for example, because of the incorporation into the measure of a "scheme or formula that causes and ensures that levies change automatically and continuously." Apart from these elements, the 14 Appellate Body noted that a common feature of variable import levies is "a lack of transparency and lack of predictability in the level of duties that will result from such measures. sets out a formula that must be applied by the Chilean Executive every two months to establish a new amount of duty under the price band system. In the case of wheat, this duty is the (positive) difference between a reference price and the floor price "multiplied by a factor of one (1), plus the general ad valorem duty in force" for wheat. In the case of wheat flour, it is the duty 17 determined using the formula for wheat multiplied by a factor of 1.56. The price band duty is, 18 thus, "liable to vary" because of an intrinsic "formula that causes and ensures that levies change automatically and continuously."
13.
Chile has argued that the price band duty has ceased varying "continuously" because it now changes once every two months, rather than once every week as it did under the original price band system. We cannot discern, nor has Chile identified, a basis for such a distinction to be drawn.
Similarly, the fact that Chile has added a new administrative requirement that the Chilean
Executive publish the amount of the price band duty in a Ministry of Finance Decree at the start
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at not clear how simply interjecting a layer of clerical tasks could break the link between the formula established as part of the price band system and the level of the duties automatically calculated through its application.
15.
As for the Appellate Body's observation that a common feature of variable import levies is "a lack of transparency and lack of predictability in the level of duties that will result from such measures," we note that it is not just any "lack of transparency" and "lack of predictability" that 20 is of concern. Rather, it is a "lack of transparency" or "lack of predictability" regarding "the level of duties that will result from such measures." It is not clear to us that this aspect of "transparency" is being addressed in the debate between the parties on issues of transparency relating to other aspects of the price band system.
16.
When one looks at Chile's modified price band system and variable import levies from the standpoint of an exporter, the measures do seem to be similar in the lack of transparency and predictability in the level of the duties resulting from their application. In both cases, the lack of transparency and predictability results from the complex nature of the mechanism applied to determine the level of the duties and the fact that it may be difficult to ascertain -if not impossible to know ahead of time -all of the elements necessary to determine the precise level of duties.
17.
To illustrate, consider the fact that to determine the level of the duty under Chile's modified price band system, it is necessary to know the reference price that will be compared to the price band threshold. The reference price consists of "the average of the daily international wheat prices recorded in the markets most relevant to Chile over a period of 15 calendar days counted backwards from the [bi-monthly] date set out in Regulation No. 831 for each decree establishing specific duties." Unless an exporter sells, ships, and lands the shipment within the 21 current two-month window -which would be unusual, according to Argentina, as a "majority of sales are made under forward contracts" -the exporter will simply not know the level of the 22 duty that will apply to its exports. explained, in the absence of that kind of transparency and predictability about the level of the duties, there is a danger that exporters will not ship to the market in question, which will impede the transmission of international prices to the domestic market. 
19.
Turning next to the question of whether the modified price band system is similar to a minimum import price, it would appear that there has been little change to the price band system that would make it any less similar to a minimum import price now than it was before.
20.
Chile asserts that "minimum import price schemes generally operate in relation to the actual transaction value of . . . imports." However, neither the original price band system nor 27 the modified system calculates duties by reference to actual transaction prices. Rather, both use as the reference price the price for a certain quality of wheat in the foreign "markets of concern." Chile argues that because "the reference price [in the modified price band system] has nothing to do with the transaction value" the system is "neither a minimum import price nor similar to one." However, this distinction did not preclude a finding of "similarity" in the original 28 proceeding, and it is not clear why it would do so now. Member could avoid the obligations of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture by maintaining a minimum import price (or a measure similar to one) and simply labeling the threshold price as something other than a "minimum import price," "a CIF price," or "an entry price."
c. "Sustaining" an entry price, internal price, or an administratively determined price above the domestic price
22.
Finally, Chile makes a general argument regarding the alleged "fundamental characteristics" of variable import levies and minimum import prices that we would like to address. Specifically, Chile argues that a "fundamental characteristic" of these measures is the intent "to sustain a price and that that price is measured as an entry price, as an internal price, as a value linked to the internal price, or as an administratively determined price which is above the 
